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NOTES

ground that control was not sufficient to establish such liability.'7
However, the federal courts seem to disregard the corporate entity and
place the liability upon the 20parent, upon the ground of agency,18 instrumentality, 19 or identity.
It cannot be determined upon what ground a court will hold the
parent, if at all; that depends upon the jurisdiction, and the degree of
identity of the corporations, or of the stockholders and directors in
both corporations. But, it can be said, with some degree of certainty,
that a court will not allow the creditors of the insolvent member of the
unit to be defrauded, nor allow the corporation to evade laws which
have been dictated by public 'policy, nor to escape existing or future
obligations, nor even to escape legal liability for tort, by adhering to
the doctrine of "corporate entity". The "legal entity" theory will be
upheld as long as is possible, but whenever any of the above elements
become present, the. court will look through to substance, rather than
to form.
FRANic J. ANTOINE.

RECENT TENDENCIES IN THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITY
HOLDING COMIPANIEs.-Seldom in American history has the close re-

lationship between law and economics been as strikingly revealed as in
the past three years. With the collapse of a business structure based
upon legal principles developed in a laissez-faire agrarian society, there
has come to most lawyers the disconcerting realization that law is not
Berkey v. Third Ave Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926); Plaintiff was injured while leaving a street car. The franchise to operate a street railway
along that line belonged to the Forty-Second St. Co. and no one else. However, substantially all the stock of the company was owned by the Third Ave.
Ry. Co., which had its own franchise along other streets. The parent company
was not held liable; but the court seemed to be protecting the creditors of the
controlling company and the interest of the public in cheap and efficient operation of public utilities. Owl Fumigating Corp. v. Californ'a Cyanide Co., supra;
Bergenthal v. Boynton Automobile Livery Co. and Green Cab Co., 179 Wis. 42,
190 N.W. 901 (1922), where the parent company was not estopped from denying that the subsidiary was its agent or that the two were in fact one; Atchison, 7., and S. F. R. R. v. Cochran, 43 Kans. 225, 23 Pac. 151 (1890) ; Stone
v. Cleveland, etc. Ry., supra; Friedman v. Vandalia R. R. Co., 254 Fed. 292
(C.C.A. 8th, 1918).
's Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. Delachesa, 145 Fed. 617 (C.C.A. 2d, 1906).
190 Joseph Foard Co. v. Maryland, 219 Fed. 827 (C.C.A. 4th, 1914).
2-Davis v. Alexander, 269 U.S. 114, 46 Sup. Ct. 34, 70 L.Ed. 186 (1925) ; "Where
one railroad company actually controls another and operates both as a single
system, the dominant company will be liable for injuries due to the negligence
of the subsidiary company"; Ross v. Pen nsylvania R. R. Co., 148 A. 741
(N.J. 1930); "Where a corporation holds stock of another, not for the purpose of participating in the affairs of the other corporation in the normal and
usual manner, but for the purpose of control, so that the subsidiary company
may be used as a mere agency or instrumentality for the stockholding company, such company will be liable for injuries due to the negligence of the
subsidiary, and the mere fact that an accident is caused by the negligence of
persons in the employ of the subsidiary will not relieve the dominant company
of responsibility." The question of liability was not determined in this case,
the court holding that the evidence should have been submitted to the jury to
determine if such control was present.
I7
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a cold scientific guide to justice, but rather a human philosophy of
civilization-human in that it is subject to all the errors and mistakes
of mankind, human in that it must adapt itself to modern conditions,
and in so doing build the foundation for a better and a finer society.
Perhaps in few legal fields have the current economic adjustments met
with greater response than in that of public utilities law. And yet it
is only natural that a comparatively new and plastic development of
legal theory should lend itself more readily to violent changes than
the hardened and crystallized judicial dogmas of seventeenth century
England.
In April, 1930, Martin J. Insull, speaking before The Academy of
Political Science, made the following statement:
"The holding company or utilities investment company is entitled
to the same freedom of action as any other business and it is that freedom that has enabled it to do the great work it has in the development
of the electric industry in this country to a pre-eminent position in the
whole world....
Regulation of the operating company with freedom of the holding
company is to the best interest of the public." 1
While the events of the past two years seem to have cast considerable doubt as to the validity of the above contention,2 it is interesting
to note what strong approval it met with in the halcyon days preceding
the depression. Thus, the Massachusetts Special Commission on Control and Conduct of Public Utilities, reported in March, 1930:
"We do not believe that the time has come when direct regulation
of holding companies is necessary. The operating
company remains,
3
in our opinion, the proper unit to be regulated."
Such also was the view of the Investment Bankers' Association
which through its Public Service Securities Committee, issued the following statement in May, 1930:
"This Association looks with misgiving on any attempt at regulation of holding companies, believing that full flexibility in the special
services
they so admirably perform is of the first importance to pre' 4
serve.
InsulI, "Is Control of Operating Companies Sufficient?" Proceedings of the
Academy of Political Science, Vol. XIV, No. 1, at pages 87, 88, 89. (April,
1930). Cf. Cassius M. Clay, "Regulation of Public Utilities," 1932, p. 252.
2James C. DeLong, "Holding Company Practices That Invite Regulation,"
Public Utilities Fortnightly, Dec. 22, 1932, p. 733. "During the interval of
readjustment and reappraisal of values which began in the fall of 1929, more
than one hundred enterprises, identified in one capacity or another with the
public utility industry, have sought the refuge of receivership. * * * According to a recent compilation of Dow, Jones & Co. of the total bond issues in
default as of August 1, 1932, aggregating more than two and one-half billion
dollars, the public utilities contributed more than any other single industry
with seven hundred and seventy-two million dollars, or nearly 30% of the
total."
Report of Special Commission on Control and Conduct of Public Utilities
under Chapter 55 of the Resolves of 1929 (Mass.) taken from United States
Daily for M\arch 5, 1930, page 12, Cf. Cassius M. Clay, op cit., p. 253.
4See David E. Lilienthal, "Recent Developments in the Law of Public Utility
Holding Companies," 31 Col. Law Rev. 189 (1931).
1
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But in the intervening years, the pendulum of public opinion has
swung so far to the opposite side, that statements such as the following
win popular acclaim today:
"Indirect regulation of holding companies by the state commissions
has . . . proven comparatively ineffective, and cannot well be other-

wise. There is need, therefore, of direct regulation."'
"That it (the holding company) has the power to do public injury
cannot be denied even by the most biased defenders. The theory that
state commission control of the operating company is sufficient public
protection has been exploded by events of the recent past."'6
"We propose regulation to the full extent of Federal power of
holding companies which sell securities in interstate commerce. '"
Indeed, so great has been the public reaction against the holding
company, that the radicals of 1929 find themselves in the ranks of the
conservatives of 1933.8 Today, the issue is no longer whether the holding company should be regulated or not, but whether the holding company should be abolished or regulated. 9 And in view of this great
shift of opinion on the part of economists, statesmen, and public utility authorities, it is most interesting to notice in what manner the
courts and the commissions have taken cognizance of this turbulent
economic upheaval.
A summary of the fundamental theories of holding company regulation is necessary, however, for an understanding of recent decisions
and legislation. Generally, there are two theories of holding company
regulation: first, direct regulation of the holding company, itself; and
second, indirect regulation of the holding company through the regulation of the operating company. The first comprehensive discussion of
these theories was presented in 1929 by David E. Lilienthal, now of
the Wisconsin Public Service Commission ;20at that time Mr. Lilienthal
pointed out that the direct regulation theory had found little favor
with the states, in that few statutes had been enacted for the direct
regulation of holding companies," in that the court had consistently
denied the commissions direct jurisdiction over holding companies,"
5 Jones & Bigham, "Principles of Public Utilities," 1932, p. 616.

C. DeLong, op. cit., p. 733.
7 Democratic National Convention 1932 Platform. Also see Report of Federal
Power Commission to Congress, September 17, 1932, in -which Federal regulation of utility holding companies was recommended as absolutely essential in
the public interests.
8 Witness the success of the book, "The Holding Company" by Bonright and
6.1ames

Means.

9 See William A. Pendergast, "The Ordeal By Water of The Holding Co."
Public Utilities Fortnightly, May 11, 1933, p. 595. "But does not a consideration
of the dark side of the holding companies indicate that the trouble is not so
much in the idea or principle of the holding company, but rather in the abuses
of it? And if that be true, does it not follow that the solution lies in control,
in regulation ?"
10 David E. Lilienthal, "The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies,"
29 Col. Law Rev. 408 (1929).
"I In 1929 but four states had statutes providing for the direct regulation of
holding companies: _New York, N. Y. Pub. Service Comm. Law (1910) Sec.
5 (7); Massachusetts, Gen. Laws (1921) c. 181, sec. 3, 4, 8, c. 155, sec. 4;
Alabama, Civ. Code (1923) sec. 9792; New Jersey, N. J. P.L. (1923) 288.
a2 See In re Golden Gate Ferry Co., 28 Cal. R.C.R. 268 (1927); Federation of
Citizens' Ass'n. v. Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co., P.U.R 1923D, 152, D. of C.P.S.C.
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and in that the courts had repeatedly refused to recognize the holding
company as a public utility." On the other hand, he showed that indirect regulation of the holding company through the regulation
of the
4
operating company was the more widespread practice.1
The purpose of the indirect regulation of the holding company
through the regulation of the operating company is the protection of
the rate-payers of the public utilities. Inasmuch as the holding company generally controls the service, engineering, and supply contracts
of the operating company, inasmuch as it controls the financial operations of the operating company, it can be readily seen that by profitmaking negotiations between the operating and holding companies, the
cost of the service rendered to the consuming public can be greatly
boosted. 1" The state commissions have in the past tried to prevent
these secret deals by. the regulation of fees and charges paid by the
operating company to the holding company, 16 by the regulation of
financial and security transactions between the operating and the holding company," and by the regulation of the acquisition of operating
companies by holding companies.' s
(1924); In re Power N Electric Securities Corp. 1925 N.Y.P.S.C.R., 1,
261 (1925) ; In re Erie Power Corp. 1925 N.Y.P.S.C.R., I, 276 (1925).
13 David E. Lilienthal, "The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies,"
op. cit., p. 409. "A holding company is not a public utility in the legal sense
for it has neither the power nor does it in fact serve the public with these
services." Cf. Public Utilities Comm. v. Romberg, 275 Ill. 432, 114 N.E. 191
(1916): Toledo Light, Traction & Power Co. v. Simith, 305 Fed. 643 (D.C.
Oh., 1913).
14 David E. Lilienthal, "The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies,"
op. cit., p. 408.
1"R. G. Lynch, The Milwaukee Journal, May 10, 1933, p. 13. "Some of the things
reported by the investigators in the phone case are: That A. T. & T. made an
apparent profit of more than $14,000,000 at one stroke in 1927 by selling its
subsidiaries the telephone instruments and coils which previously had been
leased to them; * * * That the company's method of charging its overhead,
engineering and supervision expenses to its subscribers was so faulty that
simple purchases on which there obviously was no engineering, such as lawn
seed, manure, panes of glass, lineoleum and countless other items, had been
heavily loaded with engineering expense."
Also see William A. Prendergast, "The Ordeal By Water of The Holding
Co." op. cit., p. 595. "The milking of operating companies by holding companies has in some instances gone to the extent of causing operating companies to pay out dividends greater than earnings. Holding companies have
lent to operating subsidiaries at unfairly high rates. They have borrowed from
subsidiaries at unfairly low rates. In some recent instances holding companies
have borrowed from operating subsidiaries or affiiates on unsecured notes,
have gone bankrupt, and have left the operating companies without funds and
without recourse."
ir See Reno Power, Light and Water Co. v. Public Service Co-ninission, 289 Fed.
790 (D.C. Nev., 1923); Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Coin,nission, 262 U.S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 67. L.Ed. 981 (1923);
Jones & Bigham, op. cit., p. 614; Cassius M. Clay. op. cit.. pp. 254-256.
"1David E. Lilienthal, "The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies,"
op. cit., pp. 420-421; Jones & Bigham, op. cit., p. 615. See Re Eastport Water
Companfv, P.U.R. 1929E, 136, (1929) ; Cassius M. Clay, op. cit., pp. 256-257.
's David E. Lilienthal, "The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies,"
op. cit., pp. 421-422. In 1929 only six states required that the purchase of
stock of a public utility company by a holding company be approved of by the
commissions. They were Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey,
and New York. The number has been greatly increased since then. See sec.
196.52 (3), Wis. Stats.
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But it is one thing to try to regulate the reasonableness of charges
made by a holding company to its operating subsidiary, and quite another thing to succeed. Thus, as early as 1923, the Federal Courts
recognized that the operating expenses of a utility 19 were of necessity
open to scrutiny by the regulatory commission. Yet until 1930, both
legislatures and courts failed to realize that the efficiency of this regulation depended upon the ability of the commission to determine
whether or not the charges made by a holding company to its subsidiaries were reasonable. For example, the greatest practical difficulty
is met with in evaluating the services which a holding company renders
with regard to management and construction. 21 According to Commissioner Lilienthal, "By far the most common contract is that under
which the holding company agrees to furnish the technical and financial
service" to the operating company. 2 Yet, with all the difficulty involved in ascertaining the reasonableness of fees for service, with the
necessary documents and records and cost accounts in the possession
of the holding companies charging these fees, the courts have in the
past held that the burden of proving the unreasonableness of these fees
lay with the commission.3 Typical of this attitude is the decision of
39 See Reno Power, Light and Water Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra.
20 But notice the language of State P.U.C. ax rel. Springfield v. Springfield G. &
E. Co., 291 Il. 209, 125 N.E. 891 (1920) : "The Commission is not the financial
manager of the corporation and it is not empowered to substitute its judgment
for that of the directors of the corporation; nor can it ignore items charged
by the utility as operating expenses unless there is an abuse of discretion in
that regard by the corporate officers."
2 Cassius M. Clay, op. cit., p. 254-255. "Perhaps the first and foremost (difficulty)
is the practical difficulty of defining and evaluating the services which a holding company renders. Fees for construction work are more easily related to a
market test of the value of the services than fees for management."
David E. Lilienthal, "The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies," op. cit., p. 415, points out that in an attempt to ascertain the value of
services, some states have adopted a basis of computation under which the
holding company receives as compensation a fixed percentage of the gross
revenues of the operating company. See Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Public Service Coni',mission, supra; Houston v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co., 259 U.S. 318, 42 Sup. Ct. 486, 66 L.Ed. 961 (1921);
Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. P. S. C., 300 Fed. 190 (D.C. Ind., 1924) ; State ex rel
Hopkins v .Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 115 Kan. 236 (1924); Pacific Tel &
Tel. Co. v. Whitcomnb, 12 F. (2) 279 (D.C. Wash., 1926).
22David E. Lilienthal, "The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies,"
op. cit., p. 415.
23Justice Stone in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Conrn. of Ky., 278 U.S. 300,
49 Sup. Ct. 150, 73 L.Ed. 390 (1929) : "We recognize that a public service commission, under the guise of establishing a fair rate, may not usurp the function of the company directors and in every case substitute its judgment for
theirs as to the propriety of contracts entered into by the utility; and common
ownership is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding such intercorporate agreements when it appears that, although an affiliated corporation may
be receiving the larger share of the profits, the regulated company is still receiving substantial benefits from the contract and probably could not have
secured better terms elsewhere." Also see Alissouri ex rel. St. Joseph v. Public
Service Comm. (1930), 30 SA. (2d) 8: "It is no concern of either the customers of the water company or the commission, if the water company obtains
necessary material, labor, supplies, etc. from the holding company so long as
the quality and price of the service rendered by the water company are what
the law says they should be."
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the Nebraska Federal District Court in the case of Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Spillman,24 where the court held:
"The presumption is that this contract (between the holding and
operating company for services) was entered into in good faith and in
the exercise of a proper discretion by the officers of both corporations.
To overcome this presumption, it was incumbent on the defendants
(the state authorities) to show that the contract was not made in the
exercise of a proper discretion by the plaintiff's officers." 25
As a result of this view, the regulatory commissions were forced
to attack the service charges levied by holding companies upon their
operating subsidiaries, with the meager data they were able to obtain
by means of "fishing trips" into the records of hostile companies. And
although statutes have been enacted in several states giving the commissions power to search the books and records of holding companies,2 6 yet a holding company incorporated in a foreign state, 7 may if
it chooses to do so, prevent the enforcement of these statutes2
But this stand has not escaped criticism. In 1925 the Wisconsin
Railroad Commission attacked the decision of Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Spillman,25 on the ground that state commisisons have no
power to demand the records of foreign holding companies. 9 Later
decisions have served but to emphasize the Commission's position that
failure to prove the cost of management fees to the holding company'
will result in the disallowance or reduction of such fees.30 Commissioner Lilienthal, writing in the Columbia Law Review for 1931, 31
points out that the Federal Power Commission, together with commissions in California, Illinois, and Pennsylvania have reduced or disallowed fees where proof of their value had not met with the approval
of the commissions, or where they had involved duplication.3 2 In the
famous case of Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company,33 the
United States Supreme Court, although not deciding the question of
whether the commission or the utility should bear the burden of prov246

F. (2) 633 (D.C. Neb., 1925).

25 Cf. David E. Lilienthal, "The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Com-

panies," op. cit. p. 419.

26 New York, Laws of 1930, ch. 760; Massachusetts, Acts of 1930, ch. 395.

See Jones & Bigham, "Principles of Public Utilities," op. cit., p. 616: "The
State of New York, for example, cannot compel a holding company incorporated in another state to bring its books and records to New York. The
state cannot even serve an order on a foreign corporation which is not doing
business within the state; and service on an agent of the subsidiary does not
effect service on the parent corporation."
-s6 F. (2) 633 (D.C. Neb., 1925).
29 In re Wisconsin Telephone Co., 28 Wis. R.C.R. 351 (1925).
30 In re St. Croix Valley Telephone Co., P.U.R. 1929B, 597 (1929) ; In re Wisconsin Public Utility Co., P.U.R. 1930A, 119 (1929).
31 David E. Lilienthal, "Recent Developments in the Law of Public Utliity Hold32 ing Companies," op. cit., p. 189.
Redlands v. South'western H. Tel. Co., 35 Cal. R.C.R. 150 (1930) ; In re Los
Angeles G. & E. Co., 35 Cal. R.C.R. 443 (1930); In re Boynton Tel. Co., 8
Ill. C.C.R. 396 (1928) ; In re Minier Mutual Tel Co., 8 Ill. C.C.R. 653 (1928).
Also see In re Dayton Power & L. Co., Ohio P.U.C. No. 341 (1930), where
the commission held that an increase in retail rates would not be authorized
unless the petitioning company established proof of the reasonableness of the
wholesale contract rate paid to the parent company.
33282 U.S. 133, 51 Sup. Ct. 65, 75 L.Ed. 255, P.U.R. 1931A, 1 (1930).
-7
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ing the reasonableness of the service fees, did decide that in judging
fees paid by operating companies to their parent corporations, the commissions could use the cost test 34 and hold the utility's management to

the proof of reasonableness on that as well as on other bases.35
Thus, in the year 1931 the feeling was growing among the courts
that is was to the best interests of state regulation that the relations
between operating and holding companies be more strictly regarded.
But the situation was far from perfect as evidenced by the following
words of Commissioner Lilienthal, written in 1931:
"From time to time it has been said that state regulation of transactions between operating and holding companies is doomed to failure
because the state commissions are powerless to compel the production
of facts in the possession of a foreign holding company, and beyond
the reach of the commission's subpoena.
"If the doctrine should become established that the burden is upon
the operating company to establish the cost to the holding company of
services or supplies, this difficulty is minimized. Clearly the holding
company will see to it that the information is available to its operating
subsidiary without respect to the holding company's amenability to
process .....
"There may be circumstances under which access to data in the
hands of the holding company is desired, even where no rate case is
pending or contemplated. Whether the indirect compulsion suggested
by the Supreme Court in the Smith case can be supplemented by more
direct methods36is open to serious doubts under the existing authorities
and statutes.

As though in answer to his words, the Wisconsin Legislature in
1931 enacted statutes requiring that the operating company assume
the burden of proving the cost to the holding company of services and
supplies, and giving to the commission the power to collect this data
without the necessity of opening a rate case. 3 1 In fact, under the Wisconsin statutes, every contract between a public utility and its holding
company is required to have the approval of the Public Service Commission, and that approval will not be given unless it appears that the
contract is reasonable and consistent with public interest. 3 Further
provisions give the Commission the power to forbid the payment of
dividends on the common stock of the utility held by a foreign parent
company, when such payment impairs the capital resources of the util34 That is, the cost to the holding company of furnishing the service. Thus, if by
large scale production, the holding company could reduce the cost, the benefit
would go to the consumer rather than to the company. See James C. Bonbright, 31 Col. Law Rev. 209 (1931).
35 This decision supersedes the case of Houston v. SouthWestern Bell Tel. Co.,
supra.
36 David E. Lilienthal, "Recent Developments in the Law of Public Utility Holding Companies," op. cit., p. 205.
3 Sec. 196.52 (3), Wis. Stats.
38 Sec. 196.52 (3), Wis. Stats.: "* * * No such contract or arrangement shall
receive the commission's approval unless satisfactory proof is submitted to the
commission of the cost to the affiliated interest of rendering the services or
of furnishing the property or service described herein to each public utility.

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

ity.39 On Nov. 9, 1932, the state of Alabama joined Wisconsin in the
strict regulation of holding companies, through control of the activities
of the operating companies, by passing the Harrison Bill which incorporates the essential features of the Wisconsin statutes.40 In the state
of New York, Governor Lehman, on March 22, 1933, sent a message
to the state legislature recommending that laws be enacted whereby the
commission be given clear statutory jurisdiction to pass upon the reasonableness of all fees paid by operating utilities for management or
other "services" rendered by parent or affiliated corporations. It is interesting to note that the governor's measures were supported by Floyd
L. Carlisle, chairman of the boards of the Niagara Hudson Power
Corporation and of the Consolidated Gas Company.4
In step with these progressive enactments, two state commissions
definitely asserted their right to be shown the proof of the reasonableness of service fees charged by holding companies. In California, the
Railroad Commission pointedly held in the case of Paul J.Hopper et al.
v. Lassen Electric Co. 42 that the jurisdiction of the Commission in
fixing utility rates could not be restricted or circumvented by an"
agreements which a utility might make for the purchase of power, unless it could be affirmatively shown that such agreements were just and
reasonable and in the public interest. And in Oregon, the Public Utilities Commissioner decided in the case of Re Northwestern Electric
Company,4 3 that fees paid under a contract by an operating utility to an
affiliated company, under common corporate control, could be charged
to operating expenses only when services actually needed were rendered, when such services were valuable to the operating company,
when charges represented the actual cost of rendering such service,
and when such charges did not exceed the cost of substitute service.
Most typical of the "new deal" attitude if that of the Wisconsin
Public Service Commission in the case of Re Mid-West State's Telephone Co., Inc.44 Payment of dividends by an electrical utility on its
common stock which was held by a foreign parent concern was forbidden pending further investigation by the Commission, where preliminary evidence indicated that expenditures needed to keep service
unimpaired had been postponed by the utility. The language of the
Commission is as follows:
"Is has frequently been asserted during the past decade that Commission jurisdiction over holding companies or their financial transactions with operating subsidiaries was not necessary for adequate protection of consumers' interest in service and reasonable rates. In this
instance we apparently have a direct refutation of such assertions.
Here is an operating company which appears to be postponing expen30 Sec. 184.11, Wis. Stats.: "'Vhenever the commission shall find that the capital
of any public service corporation is impaired it may, after investigation and
hearing, issue an order directing such public utility to cease paying dividends
on its common stock until such impairments have been made good."
40 See Hugh White, president of the Public Service Commission of Alabama,
"Regulating Operating Companies," Public Utilities Fortnightly, March 30,
1933, p. 379.
4'
See Public Utilities Fortnightly, April 27, 1933, p. 531.
42
P.U.R. 1933B, 277 (1933).
43P.U.R. 1933B, 41 (1933).
4' P.U.R. 1933A, 249 (1933).
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ditures needed to keep service unimpaired and turning over its cash resources to a holding company seemingly for the sole or primary benefit
of still another holding company which is in the hands of. receivers.
If further investigation establishes these indications as facts beyond
reasonable doubt, a direct and immediate injury to consumers' interests is involved. If long continued, this policy will probably require
higher rates to restore service to that quality contemplated by the existing rate schedule. Even now or in the immediate future, the present
rates may prove unreasonably high because paid for poorer service resulting from the postponement of necessary expenditures."
A survey of the present situation, consequently, reveals that the interests of the rate payer can be adequately protected by the strict
regulation of the transactions between operating and parent holding
companies. Close scrutiny of service and management charges and
careful checking of the financial relations of subsidiary companies
should serve to safeguard the consuming public with regard to reasonable rates and adequate service. In that respect, it is quite clear that
indirect regulation of the holding company by the state commissions is
both practical and desirable. It is equally clear, however, that state
regulation fails to exercise any control over the holding company with
respect to the protection of the investing public. 45 There is a definite

need today for Federal regulation of the financial transactions of the
holding companies to prevent over-capitalization of these corporatiorls. 4 6 It is with the recognition that the case for and against direct

regulation of holding companies has been over-stated by the opponents
and adherents of the holding company, that the writer closes this
article. Certainly, indirect regulation through the state commissions
will not be proven a failure until the new statutes of Wisconsin and
Alabama have been thoroughly tested. Likewise, there is an obvious
need for supplementary Federal direct regulation to safeguard the investing public which is not protected by state regulatory bodies. The
holding company has a definite place in our modern economic civilization. But it is imperative that our legislatures, commissions, and courts
recognize that American society cannot tolerate the continuation of
those legal principles which made possible the outrageous exploitation
of the consuming and investing public by the holding companies in the
past eight years. The law must either yield to modern changes, or
break.
ERNEST 0.

EISENBERG.

15See Hugh White, op. cit., p. 389: "The Federal government
should regulate
the security issues of all utility holding companies * * *" Vhen the Federal
government exercises the authority of regulating holding company securities,
it will not only have the right, but if it does the job efficiently, it will be
necessary for it to inquire into the entire business of the holding company.
Whenever the light is turned upon the affairs of a company whose house is
not in order, the disorder stands out in bold relief and will be remedied."
46 Jones & Bigham, op. cit., p. 617.

